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ABSTRACT
We study a U.K. court reform that established a cap on the amount of costs that a successful litigant
may recover in a case litigated in the Patents County Court (PCC, now the IP Enterprise Court). We first
build a theoretical model showing that the introduction of a costs cap is equivalent to an intermediate
cost allocation rule falling between the English and American Rules. Our model suggests that the impact
of the introduction of such a fee-shifting rule on the number of claims filed and the settlement rate is
ambiguous. It shows, however, that the effect of the costs cap on IP holders’ incentives to file a claim is
stronger for smaller IP holders. Our empirical analysis of the impact of the costs cap takes advantage of
our ability to compare IP litigation in the PCC with IP litigation in the High Court of England and Wales,
which was not directly affected by the reform. Contrary to the existing literature, we find that the costs
cap increased the number of cases filed by smaller companies and decreased the rate of settlement.
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1 Introduction
We contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of litigation cost shift-
ing regimes by studying a court reform recently implemented in the U.K. (in the jurisdiction
of England and Wales). Among the possible ways to allocate the cost of adjudication be-
tween the two sides in a lawsuit, the so-called American Rule and English Rule generally
serve as the foundation for economic analysis. Under the American Rule, it is assumed that
each party will bear its own costs, which reflects the typical (though by no means exclusive)
practice in U.S. courts. Under the English Rule, it is assumed that the party on the losing
end of a lawsuit will pay its own costs as well as all costs incurred by the winning party,
which is also referred to as fee-shifting. This assumption again reflects the approximate,
but by no means exact, practice applicable in British courts.1
The existing theoretical literature on the distinction between the American and English
Rules suggests that the practice of shifting costs to the losing party has four primary effects.2
First, existing models predict that fewer suits will settle in a legal environment where the
English Rule applies. Assuming that the parties have asymmetric information about the
likely outcome of a case, the English Rule will tend to exaggerate their disagreement about
the expected value of their respective recovery or payout by adding litigation costs to the
total amount at stake in the case. Second, with similar reasoning, the literature predicts
that the English Rule will tend to increase the overall rate of litigation. For the same reason
that fewer cases will settle once filed, fewer disputes will settle before a lawsuit is filed.
Third, the literature shows that the English Rule will likely affect the types of cases that
are brought. When the parties share relatively symmetric information, the English Rule
will tend to deter the filing of weak, i.e., low-probability-of-winning, cases by reducing
the plaintiff’s total expected recovery and, conversely, under the same circumstances, the
English Rule will tend to encourage the filing of strong, i.e., high-probability-of-winning,
cases by increasing the plaintiff’s expected total award.3 In effect, the risk of paying the
defendant’s costs acts as potential penalty for bringing weak claims, while the prospect of
having one’s own costs covered by the defendant serves as a reward for bringing strong
claims. Finally, the literature predicts that the English Rule will lead parties to litigate their
cases more intensely. Because the prospect of fee shifting raises the stakes of litigation, it
likewise raises the marginal benefit of additional spending. At the same time, the potential
for a cost-recovery award decreases the marginal cost of devoting additional resources to
litigation by introducing some likelihood that one’s opponent will wind up covering that
additional cost.
Despite general consensus in the theoretical literature that the English Rule should have
these four effects, relatively little empirical evidence has been collected in an effort to con-
firm (or refute) their existence in real-world litigation.4 The relative lack of empirical evi-
1Neither the U.K. nor the U.S. legal systems actually enforce rules as rigid as those economic analysis
typically analyzes. In the U.K. a successful party is likely to recover a good deal less than its actual costs total.
For example, prevailing parties in patent cases generally recover about half to two-thirds of their actual costs
(Forsyth and Watts, 2011). In the U.S. various common law rules and statutory provisions permit fee awards
in certain circumstances, especially when a litigant has acted in bad faith (see, for example, Cohen, 2008).
2For an overview, see Spier (2007).
3As Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1998) show, the English Rule can also have the opposite effect when the
parties have asymmetric information.
4For an overview of the relevant empirical literature, see Kritzer (2002).
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dence can be explained by the difficulty inherent in making comparisons of litigation behav-
ior across jurisdictions, as well as by a general lack of (quasi-)experimental data in the area
of litigation that would allow such analysis. As a consequence, much of the available em-
pirical evidence focuses on litigation in two idiosyncratic U.S. states: Alaska, the only state
that routinely awards attorney’s fees to prevailing parties, (Di Pietro, et al., 1995; Rennie,
2012) and Florida, which applied the English rule in medical malpractice cases between
1980 and 1985 (Snyder and Hughes, 1990; Hughes and Snyder, 1995; Helland and Yoon,
2016). Most other studies examine the impact of similar, but distinct, cost-recovery rules,
including one-way fee shifting provisions applicable to certain causes of action in the U.S.
(Schwab and Eisenberg, 1988), offer-of-judgment statutes applicable in various U.S. juris-
dictions (Yoon and Baker, 2006), and the effect of various fee shifting regimes aggregated
across causes of action and jurisdictions (Williams, 2001; Fournier and Zuehlke, 1989).
Finally, scholars have gathered experimental results (Anderson and Rowe, 1995; Rowe and
Anderson, 1996; Inglis et al., 2005) and survey data (Kritzer, 1984; Pfenningstorf 1984;
Genn, 1987; Shapard, 1995) on the impact of the various fee shifting regimes.
The empirical literature on cost-recovery rules, in addition to being thin relative to its
theoretical counterpart, has also produced inconsistent findings. While studies of Florida
have found significant effects, those of Alaska have not. The results of experimental simula-
tions are similarly at odds. Moreover, even among studies that produced significant results,
only some have found effects consistent with the existing theoretical literature. This lack
of consistency further underscores the need for additional analysis.
In this paper, we study a series of court reforms implemented in the U.K. between 2010
and 2013.5 Chief among these reforms for purposes of our analysis is the introduction of a
£50,000 cap on the amount of costs recoverable in intellectual property (IP) suits filed in the
Patents County Court (PCC, recently reconstituted as the IP Enterprise Court or IPEC), one
of only two venues for litigating IP disputes in England and Wales. Post-reform, winning
parties can recover at most £50,000 in costs from their opponents (and in practice generally
much less). Any additional costs they incurred during litigation they must bear on their
own. In effect, then, the introduction of a cap on the recovery of litigation costs establishes
a new intermediate cost-recovery regime that shares characteristics of both the English and
American Rules. This means that the costs cap limits the extent to which fee-shifting is
permitted.
To study the costs cap’s effect on litigation behavior, we first build a theoretical model
in which heterogeneous IP holders need to decide whether to file a claim against an alleged
infringer. When the claim is filed, the IP holder makes a settlement offer to the alleged
infringer which can be accepted or turned down. In the latter scenario, a decision regarding
the infringement is issued by the court. Our model generalizes the seminal litigation model
by Bebchuk (1984) in two directions. First, we consider a set of heterogeneous plaintiffs
while Bebchuk (1984) deals with the case of a single plaintiff. This feature of our model
is crucial for the investigation of the effect that the costs cap has on the number of claims
filed. Second, we consider a general class of cost-recovery rules allowing us to study the
effect of any one-sided or two-sided fee-shifting rule and, in particular, a costs cap like the
one that has been implemented at the IPEC.
Our theoretical analysis concludes that the effects of a shift away from a pure English
5The U.K. comprises separate legal systems: England & Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Our data
focus on England & Wales where the overwhelming majority of cases occur.
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Rule to the hybrid regime resulting from the costs cap are in fact ambiguous. More pre-
cisely, we show that a decrease in the alleged infringer’s recoverable costs has an ambiguous
effect on the IP holder’s incentive to file a claim. This implies that the overall effect of the
costs cap on the number of claims filed is also ambiguous. We show, however, that this
effect is stronger for smaller IP holders, regardless of its sign. We also uncover an impor-
tant and heretofore unrecognized source of ambiguity for the effect of fee-shifting rules on
the settlement rate. The effect on the settlement rate consists of a direct effect (i.e., the
effect holding for a given set of plaintiffs) and an indirect effect resulting from the effect
of the costs cap on the set of plaintiffs. This indirect effect, which has been ignored in the
existing theoretical literature, makes the overall effect of fee shifting on the settlement rate
ambiguous. Finally, we show that the way this overall effect depends on the plaintiff’s size
is also ambiguous.
Second, we collect empirical evidence of litigants’ reactions to the PCC’s costs cap to
study the impact fee-shifting has on litigation behavior in actual suits. In carrying out
this analysis, we take advantage of our ability to compare IP litigation in the PCC with IP
litigation in the High Court of England and Wales (HC), which was not directly affected
by the reform and thus acts as a control group that allows us to isolate the causal effect
of the costs cap from other unobservable time-varying factors. Our empirical analysis –
based on data from over 2,000 suits (covering the period 2007-2013) hand collected from
physical court records at the PCC and HC – shows that the shift from the English towards
the American Rule led to an increase in the number of cases filed by smaller companies and
a decrease in the rate of settlement. With respect to the latter finding, we see a statistically
significant drop in settlements only in patent cases, where the effect of the costs cap is likely
more binding due to higher average litigation costs. These findings stand in contrast to the
existing literature on fee shifting.
Our analysis contributes directly to the literature on the design of litigation systems,
in particular the question of how to allocate litigation costs. In the last two decades, the
cost of litigation has played a prominent role in legal policy discussions, including those
concerning access to justice and tort or other civil justice reforms. There are a few existing
policies in the U.S. that cap legal fees similar to the IPEC, such as a cap on fees that legal
representatives can claim after successfully litigating claims for social security disability
benefits (Hoynes et al. 2016). But there are no studies of the effect of such caps on litigation
behavior. In the context of intellectual property litigation, the topic of litigation costs has
played a particularly prominent role in recent policy debates. In the U.S. policymakers
are actively debating legislative reforms that if enacted would make fee awards routine
in patent suits.6 In addition, calls for the establishment of a ‘small claims’ court for IP
disputes – one that would resemble the IPEC in many regards – have drawn the attention
of U.S. policymakers twice since 2013.7 Meanwhile, in Europe, policymakers stand on the
6For a summary of patent reform legislation proposed in the last two sessions of the U.S. Congress, see
Patent Progress (2016). In addition, in a pair of cases decided in 2014, the Supreme Court of the United
States modified the test that U.S. courts apply when deciding whether to award attorney’s fees in patent suits
in a way that many anticipate will make fee awards more common. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health &
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1744 (2014).
7In 2013, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives commissioned a report on the
topic of creating a small claims court for copyright disputes prepared by the U.S. Copyright Office, which
endorsed the idea. In 2015, patent reform legislation that passed the House again called for further study on
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precipice of establishing a Unified Patent Court (UPC), the primary function of which will
be to significantly reduce the cost of enforcing patent rights continent-wide (McDonagh,
2016). In addition, the UPC will alter the way fee shifting rules apply in many patent cases
by introducing costs caps that vary with the value of the case and, at the low end, establish
ceilings on recovery even lower than the one applicable in the IPEC.8
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first describe briefly the IP
litigation system in the U.K. and the IPEC reforms. Section 3 describes the theoretical model
and predictions. Section 4 describes the data used in our empirical analysis and Section 5
presents our analysis. Section 6 offers a few concluding remarks.
2 Legal background and reforms
There are two courts of relevance to our analysis: (i) the Patents County Court (PCC) –
since 2013 reconstituted as the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC) – and (ii)
the High Court (HC) and Patents Court (PHC), which operate within the the Chancery
Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales. The PCC (IPEC) only hears IP
cases of low value and complexity. All other IP cases are heard in the Chancery Division
of the High Court, either in the general HC, which hears cases concerning copyright, trade
marks (U.K./Community) and passing off, and unregistered designs (U.K./Community),
or at the specialist PHC, which hears cases that involve patents, and registered designs
(U.K./Community).9
The PCC underwent comprehensive procedural reforms between 2010 and 2013.10 The
reforms consisted of several stages, and were staggered over a span of four years. The most
important change for the purposes of our analysis was the introduction in October 2010
of a recoverable costs cap of £50,000 for trials on substantive liability (with an additional
cap of £25,000 relating to subsequent hearings concerning damages).11 Alongside the costs
cap, a number of other procedural changes took effect as well, including the introduction
of active case management and a limit on the time to be taken at trial. In June 2011, a
£500,000 damages cap was introduced for cases enforcing patents and designs, and this
rule was subsequently extended to all IP cases four months later. Further, between October
2012 and April 2013, the court introduced a Small Claims Track (SCT), which is available
for cases enforcing copyrights, trade marks, and rights to databases or unregistered designs
– but not cases concerning patents or registered designs. SCT claims are limited to a value
of £5,000 and costs recovery is set at a level of £260. In April 2013, the SCT Claims limit
was raised to a value of £10,000. Finally, in October 2013 the PCC was reconstituted from
a county court into a specialist court – the IPEC – within the Chancery Division of the High
the topic.
8If established, the UPC will make it possible for patent rights to be enforced across 25 European member
countries with a single suit. Under current law, enforcement must take place separately in each country. In
addition, the UPC’s proposed rules for cost shifting awards include caps on the amounts recoverable (Prepara-
tory Committee for the Unified Patent Court, 2016). Current rules propose a e38,000 cap for cases valued at
or below e250,000 and a e56,000 cap for cases valued up to e500,000.
9For a more detailed description of the U.K. IP litigation system see Cremers et al. (2016).
10For more details see Fox (2014) and Helmers et al. (2015).
11Separate hearings on damages occur in the courts of England and Wales after the conclusion of the trial
on substantive matters.
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Court of England and Wales.
Our focus is on the introduction of the costs cap in October 2010, which is widely per-
ceived by practitioners to have been the most impactful element of the PCC/IPEC reforms
described above. As noted by one attorney: “Key [to the reforms] was the costs cap of
£50,000, so parties knew the maximum that could be awarded against them from the other
side’s costs.” (Managing IP, April 2013: 56). Though the damages cap could also have
affected litigation behavior, the damages cap was set so high that in practice it is generally
not binding. Helmers et al. (2015) show that the damages cap indeed had no effect on liti-
gation behavior. We also confirmed this through extensive qualitative interviews conducted
with 17 legal practitioners (judges, solicitors, barristers, patent attorneys, trade mark attor-
neys) and 18 companies that litigated at either the PHC or IPEC. Interviewees unanimously
viewed the damages cap as ineffective because it was set at a non-binding level. In contrast,
all interviewees regarded the costs cap as the most influential component of the reform.12
More details on the legal background and reforms are provided in appendices A and B.
3 Model
This section describes a model that analyzes the effects of the costs cap on the number of
claims filed with the IPEC as well as the settlement rate of cases after filing.
3.1 Setup
Consider a dispute between an IP holder and an alleged infringer. The defendant is assumed
to have some private information about whether he does, in fact, infringe the plaintiff’s IP.
On the basis of his information, he estimates the likelihood of the IP holder prevailing in
trial to be p. This probability can be interpreted as the ‘type’ of the alleged infringer. The
IP holder does not know the alleged infringer’s type p but only that p is distributed over an
interval

p, p¯

with a differentiable cumulative distribution function F(.). We denote f (.)
the corresponding density function, which we assume to be differentiable too, and make
the standard assumption that the hazard rate
f
1−F
is increasing.
Let D ∈ (D, D¯] be the value of the damages that the defendant (i.e. the alleged infringer)
has to pay to the plaintiff (i.e. the IP holder) if the latter prevails at trial. D can be inter-
preted as the ‘type’ of the plaintiff and is assumed to be common knowledge. We denote
G(.) the cumulative distribution function for the damages and g(.) the corresponding den-
sity function. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that D and p are independent
variables so that the density of a pair (p,D) is given by f (p)g(D).
Denote s ∈

s, s¯

the patent holder’s size and m(.) the corresponding density function.
We assume that the conditional distribution of damages with respect to size has a decreasing
hazard rate, i.e.,
g(D|s)
1−G(D|s)
decreases with s for any D ∈
 
D, D¯

. This assumption captures the
idea that damages are less likely to be high for smaller IP holders.
Denote cp the cost of filing a claim and Cp the additional litigation costs that the plain-
tiff has to incur if he does neither drop the case nor settle. Also, denote Cd the alleged
infringer’s litigation costs. We consider a general cost allocation rule under which a win-
ning plaintiff recovers an amount Rp ∈

0, cp + Cp

while a winning defendant recovers an
12For detailed discussion see Helmers et al. (2015).
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amount Rd ∈ [0,Cd]. Finally, we assume that litigation costs are common knowledge and
that the plaintiff and defendant are risk-neutral.
Let us consider the following game:
Stage 1: The IP holder decides whether to file a claim, which costs cp. If he does not,
the game ends. Otherwise, it proceeds to the next stage.
Stage 2: The IP holder makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to the alleged
infringer.
Stage 3: The alleged infringer decides whether to accept the settlement offer. If he
does, the game ends. Otherwise, the IP holder incurs additional litigation costs Cp
while the defendant incurs litigation costs Cd , and a decision regarding the infringe-
ment is issued by the court.
To ensure that the IP holder’s litigation threat in case settlement fails is credible13 (as is
implicitly assumed in Stage 3) we assume that14
p ≥
Cp + Cd
cp + Cp + Cd + D
. (1)
3.2 Equilibrium analysis
Consider Stage 3. The alleged infringer knows that if he rejects the settlement offer, there
will be a trial that will cost him in expectation:
p(D+ Cd + Rp) + (1− p) (Cd − Rd)
Thus, he accepts to pay the amount S to the IP holder if and only if
S ≤ p(D+ Cd + Rp) + (1− p) (Cd − Rd)
or, equivalently,
p ≥
S − Cd + Rd
D+ Rp + Rd
≡ pˆ(D,Rp,Rd ,S)
Consider now the IP holder’s choice of the amount S requested from the alleged infringer
at Stage 2. The IP holder knows that if his settlement offer involves a payment S, there is
a probability 1− F(pˆ) that it will be accepted and a probability F(pˆ) that it will be turned
13In doing so we follow Bebchuk (1984) and the vast majority of screening models in the settlement liter-
ature (see Spier, 1992). A notable exception is Nalebuff (1987).
14To see why this condition implies that the plaintiff will never find it optimal to drop the case if settlement
fails, note that his continuation value from not dropping the case is
p
 
D+ Rp − Cp

− (1− p)
 
Cp + Rd

The latter is positive for any values p ∈

p, p¯

, D ∈
 
D, D¯

, Rp ∈

0, cp + Cp

and Rd ∈ [0,Cd] if Condition (1)
is satisfied.
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down. If the offer is accepted then the IP holder’s payoff is S − cp. If the offer is turned
down there will be a trial and the IP holder’s expected payoff will be
ρˆ
 
D− Cp + Rp

− (1− ρˆ)
 
Cp + Rd

− cp
where
ρˆ =
1
F(pˆ)
∫ pˆ
p
p f (p)dp
is the average probability that the IP holder prevails in court conditionally on the settlement
offer being turned down by the alleged infringer. Therefore, the IP holder’s expected payoff
if he files a claim and makes a settlement offer involving a payment S is given by
Πˆ(D,Rp,Rd ,S) = (1− F(pˆ))S + F(pˆ)

ρˆ
 
D− Cp + Rp

− (1− ρˆ)
 
Cp + Rd

− cp
= (1− F(pˆ))S − F(pˆ)
 
Cp + Rd

+
 
D+ Rp + Rd
∫ pˆ
p
p f (p)dp− cp
Differentiating Πˆ with respect to S yields
∂ Πˆ
∂ S
= 1− F(pˆ)− f (pˆ)
∂ pˆ
∂ S
 
S + Cp + Rd

+
 
D+ Rp + Rd
 ∂ pˆ
∂ S
pˆ f (pˆ)
= 1− F(pˆ)− f (pˆ)
Cp + Cd
D+ Rp + Rd
This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The equilibrium settlement amount S∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

and the corresponding thresh-
old p∗(D,Rp,Rd) = pˆ(D,Rp,Rd ,S
∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

) above which an alleged infringer accepts the
settlement offer are given by
f (p∗(D,Rp,Rd))
1− F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd))
=
D+ Rp + Rd
Cp + Cd
(2)
S∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

) = p∗(D,Rp,Rd)
 
D+ Rp + Rd

+ Cd − Rd (3)
Thus, the IP holder’s payoff if he files a claim is
Π
∗(D,Rp,Rd) ≡ Πˆ(D,Rp,Rd ,S
∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

)
= S∗ − F(p∗)
 
S∗ + Cp + Rd

+
 
D+ Rp + Rd
∫ p∗
p
p f (p)dp− cp
Considering now Stage 1, the IP holder files a claim against the alleged infringer if and
only if
Π
∗(D,Rp,Rd)> 0.
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3.3 Comparative statics
In this section we study the effects of a change in recoverable costs on the equilibrium num-
ber of claims and the equilibrium settlement rate. This allows us in particular to derive the
effects of implementing a (binding) costs cap which amounts to a decrease in recoverable
costs for both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Let us consider first the effect of a change in recoverable costs on the number of claims
filed by IP holders. The following lemma is useful for the subsequent analysis:
Lemma 2. There exists a unique threshold D∗
 
Rp,Rd

≥ D such that an IP holder files a claim
against the alleged infringer if and only if:
D > D∗
 
Rp,Rd

Proof. See Appendix C.
Normalizing the total mass of potential plaintiffs to 1, the equilibrium number (mass)
of claims is given by
D∫
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
g(D)dD = 1− G
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

To investigate the effect of a change in recoverable costs on the number of claims filed, we
need to study how D∗
 
Rp,Rd

depends on Rp and Rd . Assume that D < D
∗
 
Rp,Rd

so that
not all potential plaintiffs file a claim. Then, D∗
 
Rp,Rd

is such that
Π
∗(D∗
 
Rp,Rd

,Rp,Rd) = 0
Differentiating the latter with respect to Rp yields
∂Π∗
∂ D
∂ D∗
∂ Rp
+
∂Π∗
∂ Rp
= 0
which leads to
∂ D∗
∂ Rp
= −
∂Π∗
∂ Rp
∂Π∗
∂ D
Since Π∗ is increasing in D, the sign of ∂ D
∗
∂ Rp
is the opposite of the sign of ∂Π
∗
∂ Rp
. We use this
result to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium number (mass) of claims filed 1−G
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

is (weakly)
increasing in the plaintiffs’ recoverable cost Rp, and is ambiguously affected by the defendants’
recoverable cost Rd .
Proof. See Appendix C.
Let us now examine how the effect of a change in recoverable costs is affected by the
plaintiff’s size. Denote M(s,Rp,Rd) the mass of claims filed by plaintiffs of a given size s.
From Lemma 2 it follows that
M(s,Rp,Rd) = m(s)
∫ D¯
D∗(RP ,RD)
g (D|s) dD
9
and, consequently,
∂M
∂ Rp
(s,Rp,Rd) = −m(s)
∂ D∗
∂ Rd
g
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s

Therefore, the relative variation in the mass of claims filed by plaintiffs of a given size is
∂M
∂ Rp
(s,Rp,Rd)
M(s,Rp,Rd)
= −
∂ D∗
∂ Rp
g
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s

∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
g (D|s) dD
= −
∂ D∗
∂ Rp
g
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s

1− G
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s

Consider two sizes s and s′ such that s < s′. Since the hazard rate
g(D|s)
1−G(D|s)
is decreasing in s
then
g
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s

1− G
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s
 > g
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s′

1− G
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s′

and, therefore,
∂M
∂ Rp
(s,Rp ,Rd )
M(s,Rp ,Rd )
∂M
∂ Rp
(s′,Rp ,Rd )
M(s′,Rp ,Rd )
> 1
This means that the effect (in relative terms) of a change in Rp on the number of claims
filed is stronger for plaintiffs of smaller size.
Similarly,
∂M
∂ Rd
(s,Rp,Rd)
M(s,Rp,Rd)
= −
∂ D∗
∂ Rd
g
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s

1− G
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s

which implies that
∂M
∂ Rd
(s,Rp ,Rd )
M(s,Rp ,Rd )
∂M
∂ Rd
(s′,Rp ,Rd )
M(s′,Rp ,Rd )
> 1
Thus, even if ∂ D∗/∂ Rd has an ambiguous sign (contrary to ∂ D
∗/∂ Rp) we are again able to
conclude that the effect (in relative terms) of a change in Rd on the number of claims filed
is stronger for plaintiffs of smaller size.
These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2. The effect (in relative terms) of a change in recoverable costs on the number
of filed claims decreases with the plaintiff ’s size.
Let us now turn to the effect of a change in recoverable costs on the settlement rate.
The following proposition provides the effects of Rp and Rd on the probability of settlement
for a given plaintiff that files a claim, i.e.,
q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

≡ 1− F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd))
Lemma 3. The probability of settlement for a given plaintiff decreases with both his recoverable
cost and the defendant’s recoverable cost:
∂ q∗
∂ Rp
< 0 and
∂ q∗
∂ Rd
< 0
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Proof. See Appendix C.
This lemma only captures part of the effect of the costs cap on the settlement rate.
The reason is that the mass (or more generally the set) of filed claims is also affected by
recoverable costs. More precisely, the equilibrium settlement rate is given by
θ ∗
 
Rp,Rd

=
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D)dD∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
g(D)dD
Let us first consider the effect of Rp on the settlement rate. Differentiating θ
∗ with respect
to Rp and rearranging terms leads to
∂ θ ∗
∂ Rp
=
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
∂ q∗
∂ Rp
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D)dD∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
g(D)dD︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect >0
+
−∂ D∗
∂ Rp
g(D∗
 
Rp,Rd

)h∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
g(D)dD
i2
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)

q∗
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

,Rp,Rd

− q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D)dD
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect <0
This shows that a change in the plaintiff’s recoverable cost has two effects: a direct
effect (i.e., for a given set of plaintiffs), and an indirect effect resulting from the change
in the set of plaintiffs who file an infringement claim. It follows from Proposition 3 that
the direct effect is positive. However, the indirect effect is negative. To see why, note first
that D∗ is decreasing in Rp (as shown in the proof of Proposition 1). Moreover, it follows
from expression (2) and the assumption that the hazard rate f /(1− F) is increasing that
p∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

is decreasing in D. This implies that q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

is increasing in D and, in
particular, that
q∗
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

,Rp,Rd

− q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

> 0
for any D ∈
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

, D¯

.
Let us now consider the effect of a change in Rp on the equilibrium settlement rate.
Differentiating θ ∗ with respect to Rd yields
∂ θ ∗
∂ Rd
=
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
∂ q∗
∂ Rd
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D)dD∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
g(D)dD︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect >0
+
−∂ D∗
∂ Rd
g(D∗
 
Rp,Rd

)h∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
g(D)dD
i2
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)

q∗
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

,Rp,Rd

− q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D)dD
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect of ambiguous sign
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This shows that a change in the defendant’s recoverable costs has also both a direct
and an indirect effect on the settlement rate. As in the case of a change in the plaintiff’s
recoverable costs the direct effect is positive. However, the indirect effect is now ambiguous
because the sign of ∂ D∗/∂ Rd is ambiguous.
We summarize the effects of recoverable costs on the equilibrium settlement rate in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. An increase in the plaintiffs’ (defendants’) recoverable costs has two effects
on the settlement rate: a direct effect, i.e. for a fixed set of filed claims, which is negative,
and an indirect effect, resulting from the change in the number of claims, which is positive
(ambiguous).
This proposition implies in particular that the overall effects of Rp and Rd on the settle-
ment rate are ambiguous in general.
Let us now turn to the effect of the plaintiff’s size on the impact of a change in Rp on
the settlement rate. Denoting
θ ∗(Rp,Rd |s) =
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D|s)dD∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
g(D|s)dD
the settlement rate for plaintiffs of a given size s, we have
∂ θ ∗(Rp ,Rd |s)
∂ Rp
θ ∗(Rp,Rd |s)
=
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
∂ q∗
∂ Rp
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D|s)dD
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D|s)dD
+
−∂ D∗
∂ Rp
g(D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s)∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
g(D|s)dD
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)

q∗
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

,Rp,Rd

− q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D|s)dD
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D|s)dD
which can be rewritten as
∂ θ ∗(Rp ,Rd |s)
∂ Rp
θ ∗(Rp,Rd |s)
=
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
∂ q∗
∂ Rp
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D|s)dD
∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D|s)dD︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+
∂ D∗
∂ Rp

 g
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s

1− G
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s
 − q∗  D∗  Rp,Rd ,Rp,Rd g
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

|s

∫ D¯
D∗(Rp ,Rd)
q∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

g(D|s)dD


︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
Theway this expression depends on the plaintiff’s size s is ambiguous in general. To see why,
notice that the indirect effect does not depend only on the hazard rate g (D|s)/ (1− G (D|s))
(which decreases with s) but also on g (D|s). Since ∂ g (D|s)/∂ s cannot be the same for all
D ∈
 
D, D¯

,15 the indirect effect is ambiguously affected by the plaintiff’s size.16
A similar reasoning applies if we consider the effect of the defendant’s recoverable cost
Rd . We therefore get the following result:
15This follows from the fact that
∫ D¯
D
g(D|s)dD = 1 for any s ∈

s, s¯

.
16For the same reason, the impact of the plaintiff’s size on the direct effect is also ambiguous.
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Proposition 4. The effect (in relative terms) of a change in recoverable costs on the settlement
rate is ambigously affected by the plaintiff ’s size.
Since implementing a (binding) costs cap amounts to reducing the recoverable costs for
both the plaintiff and the defendant, we can derive from Propositions 1 to 4 the following
theoretical predictions that can be tested with our data:
Prediction 1. The effect of the costs cap on the number of claims filed is ambiguous. However,
any effect of the costs cap on the number of claims filed is stronger for smaller IP holders.
Prediction 2. The effect of the costs cap on the settlement rate is ambiguous. Moreover, this
effect depends ambiguously on the plaintiff ’s size.
4 Data
This section describes the detailed information collected from from physical IP case court
records at the IPEC and the PHC/HC for 2007-2013.
4.1 PCC/IPEC
We collected information on all IP cases filed at the IPEC for the entire period 2007-2013.
In order to do this, we compiled the physical IPEC court records/files and associated in-
formation for all cases filed 2007-2013, extracted the relevant information, and compiled
it into a single database. Because the record keeping at the IPEC is largely paper-based,
there are a very small number of cases for which we were unable to obtain any information
except for the case number. Nonetheless, we are confident that we have collected informa-
tion on every possible physical IPEC case file for 2007-13. We double checked our data in
September 2014 with the available IPEC judgments for 2007-2013 online (via court doc-
ument repository BAILII); reassuringly, we did not find any cases that we did not already
have a record of from our search of the physical files (for more details on the data collection
see appendix D).
For IPEC cases, the information that we collected for all types of IP contains detailed
information on the start date of the case, the initial and counter claims (infringement,
revocation etc.), the names of the litigating parties, information on the relevant IP right
(including patent numbers, trademark numbers etc.), and the outcomes of the cases. We
also gathered information on whether cases were transferred from the IPEC to the PHC/HC
or vice versa to analyze any potential spillover effects of the reform on the PHC/HC. These
data were collected during the period September 2013-July 2014 and are up to date in
terms of outcomes (decided cases, settlements etc.) up to July 2014.
4.2 PHC/HC
In contrast with the IPEC records from 2007-2013, the PHC/HC IP case files are not held in
a unique location, but are shuffled within the general Chancery section that hears a large
range of claims, including insolvency claims, business and property disputes etc. There is
no list of IP-specific case numbers which are attributable to the various IP Chancery cases.
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In order to identify IP cases, we had to physically go through each of the estimated 5,000
Chancery Division case files for each year, one-by-one, to check if it is an IP-related claim or
another Chancery matter. For the PHC patent cases, we collected the same set of informa-
tion as in the case of the IPEC for all PHC patent cases filed 2007-2013. However, to keep
the data collection manageable, for the other types of IP rights (copyright, designs, database
rights, and trademarks), we collected information only on basic case characteristics, such
as the names of the parties, filing date, claims, etc. (see appendix D).
Note that court records for patent cases were available for the entire 2007-2013 period,
whereas for all other IP rights, court records were only available for the period 2009-2013.17
Regarding the patent data, there is a caveat for 2007, however. According to the U.K.
Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS) some 2007 Chancery files were destroyed in a fire
during 2008. As a result our PHC numbers for 2007 have to be treated cautiously as it
is likely some PHC claims were destroyed before we could examine them. That said, it is
reasonable to assume that files were randomly destroyed by the fire and hence it should
not necessarily affect case characteristics in 2007 (including case outcomes). Similar to the
IPEC data collection, we undertook a number of checks to ensure the completeness of the
patent data which are described in appendix D.
4.3 Firm-level data
We obtained the names of all litigating parties from the court records as described above.
We first cleaned and standardized these names as they often appear in different ways on
different court records. In a second step we classified litigants into 3 categories: (i) com-
panies, (ii) individuals, and (iii) government, universities, and not-for-profit entities. In a
third step, we identified non-U.K. litigants where possible (e.g. through information avail-
able in the court records, or corporate designators such as ‘inc’). Finally, we searched for
all U.K. companies on Companies House’s online WebCheck as well as Bureau van Dijk’s
FAME database. We obtained basic information on companies from Companies House (SIC
code, incorporation date, current status etc.) and detailed financials from FAME (assets,
turnover, employees etc.). The combination of information from Companies House and
financials from FAME allowed us to classify companies into size categories (micro/SME,
large).18 We also used the firm-level information in combination with additional informa-
tion from web-searches to consolidate litigants at the business group level. This avoids
double-counting litigants when for example the U.K. subsidiary appears as a plaintiff to-
gether with the U.S. holding company. Finally, using the matched firm-level data as well as
information from court records, we determined whether litigants were based in the U.K.,
elsewhere in Europe, or outside of Europe.
17The pre-2009 files had been moved into external storage where they could not be retrieved.
18We follow the standard EU definition, which relies on information on a firm’s number of employees,
turnover, and total assets.
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5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Case counts
Table 1 shows the total case counts by IP right for the IPEC as well as the PHC/HC during the
period 2007-2013.19 The largest number of cases concerns trade mark/passing off claims
(332 cases) followed by copyright (245) and design (159) cases. Regardless of the type
of IP, there is a notable jump in case numbers that occurs between 2010 and 2011 which
coincides with the introduction of the costs cap in October 2010. It is tempting to conclude
from these figures that case numbers for all IP rights have substantially increased at the IPEC
as a result of the costs cap. However, the corresponding figures for the PHC/HC caution
against hasty conclusions. As expected, for all IP rights (except designs), total case counts
are significantly larger than at the IPEC. For some IP rights, in particular patents, we also
see large increases in case counts between 2010 and 2011. Patent case counts increased
between 2010 and 2011 by 97%. Case counts for other IP rights, however, increased only
moderately or even dropped. In fact, if we take all IP rights into account, total case counts
at the IPEC increased by nearly 50% and at the PHC/HC by only 11% between 2010 and
2011. This suggests on the one hand that the costs cap has led to a large increase in case
filings at the IPEC, on the other, it also suggests that factors other than the IPEC reforms
might have affected specifically patent case filings during the critical time period.
Table 1: PCC/IPEC an PHC/HC case counts, 2007-2013
Year Patent Trade mark Design Copyright Database Total
IPEC PHC IPEC HC IPEC HC IPEC HC IPEC HC IPEC HC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2007 5 30 3 3 8 0 19 30
2008 4 64 14 3 29 0 50 64
2009 8 43 61 63 15 14 28 54 2 4 114 178
2010 8 44 43 105 17 41 33 68 2 16 103 274
2011 25 87 51 101 26 21 48 74 3 21 153 304
2012 22 84 76 94 37 13 41 50 1 7 177 248
2013 17 56 84 58 44 19 58 69 4 6 207 208
Total 89 408 332 421 159 108 245 315 12 54 823 1,306
Notes: Note: For PHC/HC no data available for trade marks, design, copyright, and database rights prior to 2009; trade mark case
count includes passing-off claims; design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Copyright case counts exclude cases
brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited).
Figure 1 investigates this issue further. It plots all cases by filing date of the claim over
time (in quarterly intervals). Since we only possess data on patent cases at the PHC/HC
19We exclude SCT cases throughout our analysis as they differ substantially in observable and presumably
unobservable characteristics from the main IPEC multi-track cases. For the same reason we also exclude all
copyright cases filed by the music licensing company PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited) at both the
IPEC and PHC/HC. These cases account for the large majority of copyright cases at the PHC. Note also that
as explained in appendix D.2, for the PHC we only have data for the entire 2007-2013 period for patents. For
all other IP rights, our PHC/HC data are limited to 2009-2013.
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before 2009, we only show PHC/HC case counts from 2009 onward (see also Table A-1 in
the appendix).20 The vertical line represents the introduction of the costs cap in October
2010. We see a clear increase in filings at the IPEC during the quarter following the intro-
duction of the costs cap and a continued increase in case filings over the remainder of the
time period for which we have data. This finding is in-line with the evidence we gathered
from qualitative interviews and surveys where respondents indicated that they regarded
the costs cap as the key reform. That said, Figure 1 also shows an increase in case filings
at the PHC during the second quarter of 2011. We know from Table 1 that this increase
was mainly due to an increase in patent filings. This could imply that the increase at the
IPEC was to some extent the result of a general trend towards more patent case filings.21
Nonetheless, a crucial point can be observed: the average growth rate of case filings during
the first three quarters of 2011 is zero at the PHC/HC whereas it is over 35% at the IPEC.
In other words, the IPEC saw substantial growth in case fillings following the introduction
of the costs cap even when compared to the PHC/HC.
As mentioned above, we have data on patent cases at both courts for the entire 2007-
2013 period. Figure A-3 in the appendix shows the number of patent cases (by filing date
of the claim form) by quarter. The figure shows a clear difference in the levels of patent
litigation at the PHC and the IPEC. We see a noticeable increase in patent cases following
the introduction of the costs cap in October 2010 (from 2 case filings in the last quarter of
2010 to 6 in the first quarter of 2011). However, as noted above, case counts at the PHC
also increased substantially between October 2010 and early 2011 (from 10 cases in the
last quarter of 2010 to 22 in the second quarter of 2011). Nonetheless, as stated above, it is
likely the PHC litigation rate increased due to additional factors, such as generally increased
litigation in information and communication technologies (for example Nokia filed 4 cases
in the first half of 2011 compared to just 1 case in the first half of 2010).22
Examining this issue in further detail and in order to test theoretical Prediction 1, Table
2 shows regression results from OLS regressions where we regress the total number of
cases by month on a dummy (0/1) variable that is equal to one for all cases heard at the
IPEC (IPEC) – a dummy variable that indicates when the costs cap was introduced at the
IPEC (Postreform) which is equal to one from October 2010 onward and their interaction
20Note that for this figure, we drop all cases at the IPEC and PHC (patents) that were dropped by the
plaintiff or for which only the claim form but no response by the defendant was filed – which are also the
data used in our settlement analysis in Section 5.2 in accordance with our theoretical analysis in Section 3.
21There is a possibility that the IPEC reforms immediately pushed high value and highly complex IP cases
into the PHC rather than the IPEC. However, given the relatively low rate of patent litigation at the PCC prior
to the reforms coming into force, it seems unlikely that this effect would be large enough to explain the large
increase in case filings at the PHC after the IPEC reforms set in. Moreover, Figures A-1 and A-2 in the appendix
show actual case transfers between the two venues before and after the reforms. As shown in Figure A-1,
the absolute number of cases transferred out of the IPEC to the PHC/HC is negligible and the number of
cases transferred from the PHC/HC to the IPEC is also very low, especially in the period following the reforms
compared to overall case counts. This is reflected in the share of cases transferred from the PHC/HC to the
IPEC shown in Figure A-2. The share decreases from an average of 14.5% before the introduction of the costs
cap to 8.1% following the reform. Therefore, there is no evidence for any significant increase in transfers
immediately following the reforms either from the IPEC to the PHC/HC or vice versa.
22It is possible that the PHC patent case count is a poor control because different factors affect litigation in
both courts. It is possible that the factors that have led to the large increase in patent case filings at the PHC
did not affect the IPEC to the same extent and hence the increase observed at the IPEC can in fact be largely
attributed to the reforms. If this is indeed the case, we would underestimate the increase in case filings at the
IPEC due to the introduction of the costs cap.
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Figure 1: Comparison IPEC-PHC/HC: all cases
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Note: Copyright case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phono-
graphic Performance Limited).
(IPEC×Postreform). The coefficient on the interaction term captures the differential effect
of the costs cap on case filings at the IPEC. Note that in general it is impossible to assess
changes in plaintiffs’ propensity to file a claim with the court because this would require
information not only on observed court cases but also the total underlying legal disputes
(i.e. court cases plus disputes that never make it to court). However, in our setting we
are able to identify a change in the filing propensity because we identify it off changes in
the number of cases filed at the IPEC following the introduction of the costs cap relative
to changes in the number of cases filed at the PHC/HC. This is a distinct advantage of our
quasi-experimental setting over analysis relying on purely observational data.
We begin by showing simple before-and-after comparisons for both the IPEC and PHC/HC
in columns (1) and (2). In both cases, we see a positive coefficient on the Postreform
dummy variable, which implies that the number of cases increased at both the IPEC and
the PHC/HC following the reforms. In column (3) we use both the IPEC and PHC/HC data
and add monthly fixed effects as well as dummy variables for the different types of IP rights
(patents, trademarks, copyright, registered designs, database rights). The PHC/HC data
controls for any unobservable confounding factors that could have affected IP litigation in
the U.K. more generally and hence allow us to isolate the impact of the costs cap on case
counts. In column (3) we observe a large negative and statistically significant coefficient
on the IPEC dummy which reflects the level differences in litigation shown in Figure 1. The
Post re f orm dummy is positive but not statistically significant. The coefficient on the in-
teraction term I PEC× Post re f orm is positive, but small in magnitude and not statistically
significantly different from zero. This means that there has been no overall increase in case
filings at the IPEC as a reaction of the introduction of the costs cap. However, in columns
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(4)-(6) we distinguish between cases where the plaintiff/defendant is a SME. If multiple
parties appear as plaintiff/defendant, we classify the plaintiff/defendant as large if at least
one party is a large firm.23 If we split the sample into cases with a SME plaintiff/defendant
and all other cases in column (4), we find a large positive coefficient on the interaction
term that is statistically significant; it suggests that the number of cases that were brought
before the IPEC that involve SMEs has increased significantly following the reforms, even
relative to the PHC/HC. Proposition 2 derived above focused on the effect of the size of the
plaintiff on the number of claims filed. The corresponding empirical results are shown in
column (5) where we look specifically at cases with SME plaintiffs. We see again a positive
coefficient on the interaction term which indicates that the number of cases that involves
SMEs as plaintiffs has increased following the introduction of the costs cap. Moreover, nei-
ther the coefficient on the IPEC dummy variable nor on the postreform dummy variable are
statistically significant. These findings support our model’s prediction that the impact of the
costs cap is greater on smaller plaintiffs. Finally, column (6) focuses on SME defendants,
where we again see a positive coefficient on the interaction term.
5.2 Settlements
In this section, we investigate any potential changes to the settlement rate following the
introduction of the costs cap. To do this, we estimate the following probit regression at the
case-level:
set t lei t = β0+β1I PECi +β2Post re f ormt +β3I PECi × Post re f ormt +γX i t +δt + ǫi t (4)
where set t lei t denotes whether case i filed in quarter t was settled (the variable is
equal to one if the case was settled),24 I PECi denotes whether case i was brought before
the IPEC (the variable is equal to one if the case was brought before the IPEC and zero if
it was brought before the PHC), and Post re f ormt is equal to one after the introduction of
the costs cap in October 2010. The specification in (4) contains also a large number of case-
and litigant-level, as well as IP right specific characteristics X i t to account for observable
heterogeneity among cases (for details see appendix E). Note that the sample of cases at
the PHC is limited to patent cases since we were unable to collect detailed information on
case outcomes for all other IP rights at the HC. For the settlement analysis, we restrict the
sample to cases that involve at least one corporate party. Further, we drop all cases at the
IPEC and PHC that were dropped by the plaintiff, for which only the claim form but no
response by the defendant was filed, or which were still pending in first instance.
Before discussing the results, Table A-2 in the appendix shows a comparison of means
of a number of case and litigant characteristics as well as settlements between cases at the
IPEC and the PHC. First, there are no significant differences in settlements between the two
courts, regardless of whether we include all IP cases at the IPEC or limit the sample to patent
cases. Second, PHC patent cases differ significantly in many ways from cases heard at the
IPEC. IPEC cases are more likely to have been transferred to the IPEC (from local courts),
23The most common case is that a subsidiary and its holding company appear together before the court.
Note that the sample in columns (4)-(6) consists only of companies which excludes a small number individual
plaintiffs and defendants, institutions, universities, and government bodies.
24Note that our results are robust to the choice of time interval for our analysis, i.e., by quarter or year.
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Table 2: IPEC and PHC/HC: total number of court cases by month, 2009-2013
IPEC PHC/HC IPEC & PHC/HC
All litigants SME
All Plaintiff Defendant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPEC -0.575*** -0.405*** -0.301 -0.429***
(0.170) (0.142) (0.212) (0.159)
Postreform 0.557*** 0.229** 0.546 -0.106 -0.449 0.045
(0.150) (0.113) (0.377) (0.373) (0.416) (0.412)
IPEC×Postreform 0.205 0.409** 0.584** 0.369*
(0.187) (0.173) (0.239) (0.185)
IP type FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Month FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
R2 0.241 0.078 0.745 0.669 0.557 0.644
Number obs. 60 60 120 120 120 120
Notes: OLS regression. Dependant variable log(number of cases by month +1). All regressions include a constant. Time period for
all IP is 2009-2013 because no data are available for trademarks, design, copyright and database rights at the PHC/HC prior to 2009;
data for patent cases for 2007-2013; trademark case count includes passing-off claims; design cases includes registered and unregistered
design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). IP type
FE: dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered design, database). Robust standard errors. *
significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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infringement claims are a lot more frequent at the IPEC, litigants are more often U.K. based
companies and a lot more likely to be SMEs. These differences are to be expected given the
different mandates of the two courts. In other words, Table A-2 confirms that cases at the
IPEC involve a lot more U.K. SMEs than cases at the PHC. This suggests that controlling for
observable case and litigant characteristics is important in the estimation of equation (4).
That said, there are no differences in average settlement shares between the two courts
over the entire sample period.
Tables 3 and 4 show the results where we report marginal effects for our probit esti-
mates (for descriptive statistics see Tables A-3 and A-4 in the appendix). In Table 4 we
restrict the sample to cases that involve SMEs, whereas in Table 3 we use all available
cases. In columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 we use data on all IP cases at the IPEC and patent
cases at the PHC. We add more case, litigant, and IP level control variables (appendix E
contains a detailed description of each variable). We see that regardless of the specifica-
tion, the I PECi × Post re f ormt interaction term is negative but not statistically significant.
In columns (4)-(6) we restrict the sample at the IPEC to patent cases. This makes IPEC
cases slightly more comparable in terms of observable characteristics to the PHC control
sample (see Table A-2 in the appendix). Moreover, one might also expect the costs cap to
be more binding for patent cases which tend to be more expensive than other IP cases due to
increased underlying technological complexity. However, the estimates on the interaction
term are still insignificant at reasonable significance levels. Next, in Table 4, we focus on
cases that involve SMEs as plaintiff and/or defendant. Here we see that the coefficient on
the interaction term is still negative but now statistically significant (except for column (1))
regardless of whether we include all IP cases or only patent cases at the IPEC. This suggests
that the introduction of a costs cap and hence the shift away from the English towards the
American rule has led to a decrease in settlements. This empirical finding supports the fact
that the indirect effect on the settlement rate we identified in our theoretical analysis is
significant enough to outweigh the direct effect emphasized in the existing literature.
There is a concern that the settlement rate might be upward biased during the last
few quarters of the sample period due to pending cases. That is, if pending cases are less
likely to settle, having more pending cases in the sample will lead to a seemingly higher
settlement rate. In the case of the IPEC, this effect would work in the opposite direction
of the effect found in Tables 3 and 4, and hence imply that we underestimate the negative
effect. However, in the case of the PHC, this effect could mean that we overestimate the
negative IPEC effect relative to the PHC – the settlement rate at the PHC would increase
relative to the IPEC. To investigate these concerns, Tables A-5 and A-6 in the appendix show
results when we drop all cases filed in 2013, as they are the ones most likely to be pending
at the time the data were collected. The results are very similar to those shown in Tables
3 and 4 and in fact suggest that we might have underestimated the negative effect of the
shift from the English towards the American rule on settlements.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of fee shifting
in civil litigation. We first develop a theoretical model to analyze the effect that fee shifting
rules have on IP holders’ decisions to file suit. Our analysis expands on existing models in
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Table 3: IPEC and PHC: settlement decision by quarter, 2007-2013
All IP Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Costs cap
IPEC -0.022 -0.052 -0.141 -0.059 -0.056 -0.089
(0.084) (0.085) (0.086) (0.166) (0.162) (0.158)
Postreform 0.297 0.288 0.252 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.999***
(0.235) (0.237) (0.236) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
IPEC×Postreform -0.087 -0.087 -0.112 -0.191 -0.201 -0.281
(0.077) (0.076) (0.080) (0.191) (0.187) (0.182)
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.068 0.076 0.063 0.048 0.049 -0.003
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.141) (0.139) (0.050)
ln case value 0.030 0.031 0.028 0.018 0.028 0.052
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045)
Infringement claim -0.016 0.025 -0.014 -0.265***
(0.071) (0.077) (0.101) (0.041)
Invalidity claim -0.103 -0.049 -0.102 -0.324***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.107) (0.081)
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME -0.078** -0.070 -0.094** 0.107 -0.065* -0.069
(0.039) (0.043) (0.045) (0.064) (0.039) (0.076)
Defendant SME 0.119*** 0.088** 0.080** 0.098* 0.099** -0.013
(0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.056) (0.036) (0.073)
Plaintiff Europe 0.054 0.053 0.061 0.080
(0.051) (0.053) (0.046) (0.062)
Plaintiff World 0.040 0.007 0.051 0.021
(0.046) (0.050) (0.042) (0.064)
Defendant Europe -0.079 -0.089 -0.077 -0.144*
(0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.077)
Defendant World -0.086 -0.102 -0.144** -0.118*
(0.065) (0.068) (0.065) (0.073)
NPE 0.043 -0.108 0.038 -0.094
(0.069) (0.088) (0.059) (0.095)
IP characteristics NO NO YES NO NO YES
Technology FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
IP type FE YES YES YES NA NA NA
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.080 0.128 0.120 0.147 0.236
Number obs. 884 884 884 386 386 386
Notes: Probit regression. Marginal effects reported. Dependant variable equal to one if case settled. All regressions include a constant.
Time period is 2007-2013; PHC/HC data contain only patent cases; IPEC trademark case count includes passing-off claims; IPEC design
cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL
(Phonographic Performance Limited). IP type FE: dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered
design, database). IP characteristics not reported include: patents – patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in
first 3 years), number of International Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, and a dummy variable equal to one
if EP patent; trademarks – dummy variables equal to one if registered community, U.K., or Madrid (WIPO) trademark filing litigated,
omitted category is unregistered trademark/passing off; design rights – dummy variables equal to one if registered community or U.K.
design right litigated, omitted category is unregistered design. Regressions include a dummy variable equal to one if the case value is
missing and a dummy variable equal to one if no patent information is available for a patent case. Technology effects for patent cases
include indicators for each main technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical engineering, other). Robust
standard errors clustered at the case-level. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.21
Table 4: IPEC and PHC: settlement decision by quarter – only cases involving SMEs, 2007-
2013
All IP Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Costs cap
IPEC -0.034 -0.015 -0.001 -0.004 0.028 0.108
(0.100) (0.106) (0.113) (0.156) (0.152) (0.092)
Postreform -0.863*** -0.850*** -0.768*** 0.535* 0.142 0.880***
(0.061) (0.068) (0.117) (0.291) (0.366) (0.148)
IPEC×Postreform -0.179 -0.230* -0.392*** -0.456** -0.539** -0.934***
(0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.224) (0.118) (0.081)
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.046 0.051 0.055 0.051 0.066 0.029
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.143) (0.142) (0.090)
ln case value 0.028 0.033 0.030 0.127* 0.148** 0.055
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.065) (0.063) (0.043)
Infringement claim -0.105 -0.073 0.088
(0.084) (0.094) (0.170)
Invalidity claim 0.002 0.033 -0.032
(0.116) (0.119) (0.152)
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME -0.087* -0.079 -0.079 0.102 0.133 0.338***
(0.049) (0.054) (0.056) (0.114) (0.122) (0.140)
Defendant SME 0.104* 0.103* 0.098* 0.012 -0.027 0.122
(0.057) (0.060) (0.060) (0.115) (0.139) (0.137)
Plaintiff Europe -0.033 -0.139 0.087 -0.121
(0.091) (0.110) (0.105) (0.141)
Plaintiff World 0.087 0.082 0.121 0.088
(0.068) (0.073) (0.104) (0.051)
Defendant Europe -0.178 -0.166 -0.181 -0.045
(0.134) (0.143) (0.154) (0.117)
Defendant World 0.008 0.019 -0.012 0.009
(0.118) (0.123) (0.148) (0.088)
NPE -0.012 -0.089 -0.202 -0.666**
(0.158) (0.199) (0.218) (0.258)
IP characteristics NO NO YES NO NO YES
Technology FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
IP type FE YES YES YES NA NA NA
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.104 0.139 0.132 0.167 0.335
Number obs. 552 552 552 123 123 123
Notes: Probit regression. Marginal effects reported. Dependant variable equal to one if case settled. All regressions include a constant.
Time period is 2007-2013; sample contains only cases involving at least one SME as either plaintiff or defendant or both; PHC/HC data
contain only patent cases; IPEC trademark case count includes passing-off claims; IPEC design cases includes registered and unregistered
design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). IP
type FE: dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered design, database). IP characteristics not
reported include: patents – patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in first 3 years), number of International Patent
Classification (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, and a dummy variable equal to one if EP patent; trademarks – dummy variables equal
to one if registered community, U.K., or Madrid (WIPO) trademark filing litigated, omitted category is unregistered trademark/passing
off; design rights – dummy variables equal to one if registered community or U.K. design right litigated, omitted category is unregistered
design. Regressions include a dummy variable equal to one if the case value is missing and a dummy variable equal to one if no patent
information is available for a patent case. Technology effects for patent cases include indicators for each main technology area (electrical
engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical engineering, other). Robust standard errors clustered at the case-level. * significant at
10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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two respects. First, rather thanmodeling the decisionmaking process of a single plaintiff, we
model the effect of fee shifting rules on a set of heterogeneous potential plaintiffs. Second,
rather than studying just the American and English rules, we study a series of cost recovery
rules, including a regime that places a cap on the amount of costs that a party may recover.
Importantly, our analysis reveals a new source of ambiguity not included in prior models:
the effect that a change in cost recovery rules has, not just on individual plaintiffs, but
also indirectly on the set of plaintiffs. Taking these novel considerations into account, our
model suggests that the net effect of fee shifting on the incentives to file a claim and the
settlement rate are ambiguous. We also analyze how the impact of fee shifting depends
on the plaintiff’s size. More precisely, we show that the effect on the number of claims
decreases with the plaintiff’s size while the effect on the settlement rate is ambiguously
affected by the plaintiff’s size.
Next, relying on a recent reform of rules for awarding fees in IP suits brought in the U.K.
we present an empirical analysis of the effect of fee shifting. Our analysis takes advantage
of the introduction of a cap on the amount of costs recoverable in suits litigated in the
U.K.’s Patents County Court. We study a set of more than 2,000 IP cases filed between
2007 and 2013 in either the PCC or the High Court, which does not employ a costs cap.
Our findings, which use data from the HC to control for unobservable time-varying factors,
suggest that the introduction of a costs cap at the PCC increased the number of suits filed
in that court but decreased the settlement rate, particularly in cases involving SMEs. The
former finding, but not the latter, is consistent with conventional wisdom in the existing
theoretical literature.
In addition to underscoring the need for further theoretical and empirical research in this
area, our findings are directly relevant to a number of legal developments unfolding across
the globe. In the U.S. policymakers have on several occasions in recent years considered
legislation that would make two-way fee awards routine in patent suits. In addition, U.S.
policymakers have recently considered establishing one or more venues modeled after the
PCC for litigating relatively small patent and copyright claims. Finally, despite being home
to the ”American Rule,” the U.S. legal system has already adopted a variety fee shifting rules
applicable in certain jurisdictions or in cases enforcing certain statutory or constitutional
rights. Important civil litigation reforms are underway in Europe as well, particularly in the
arena of IP enforcement. Europe stands on the precipice of establishing a Unified Patent
Court that would drastically decrease the cost of enforcing patent rights across the continent
and, moreover, place caps on the recovery of litigation expenses much like current practice
in the IPEC. Our findings suggest that policymakers should, among other considerations,
pay particular attention to the effect that such reforms may have on SMEs. A future shift
toward the English Rule in the U.S. may well reduce the overall rate of patent litigation,
including the number of weak suits filed by patent "trolls," but may also do so at the expense
of SMEs’ ability to enforce legitimate patent rights. If so, the creation of ”small claims”
options for IP assertion may be able to offset this effect. Conversely, our findings also
suggest that the use of costs caps in a European Unified Patent Court may well increase the
overall rate and complexity of patent litigation, but in the process may open the courthouse
door for many SMEs that previously found patent assertion prohibitively costly.
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A Appendix: Legal background
A number of key aspects of the procedures of the IPEC and the PHC/HC are described here
in order to give more information about the legal background of the reforms:
Disclosure: Within the PHC/HC there is a wide-ranging disclosure requirement un-
der the Civil Procedure Rules parts 31-35, which is on-going throughout the duration
of the case, and gives parties the ability to inspect documents belonging to the other
side, perform experiments, call expert witnesses and to engage in extensive cross-
examination. These requirements were present at the pre-reform PCC as well - how-
ever, post-reforms, in line with the active case management (ACM) that now takes
place at the IPEC – which includes the limiting of claims/submissions – both the re-
quirement of disclosure and the use of expert evidence are now much more limited at
the IPEC level than at the PHC/HC level. This represents a profound change from the
pre-2010 situation. Interestingly, in October 2015 the PHC began a two-year trial run
of a ’Shorter Trial Scheme’ which allows for disclosure and submissions to be limited
along the lines of IPEC trials (Practice Direction 51N – Shorter and Flexible Trials
Pilot Schemes). - at time of writing it was not possible to assess the success, or not,
of this trial, which falls outside of the period of our study.
Appellate Structure: Where permission is granted, appeals from the PHC/HC are
heard at the Court of Appeal, where the costs of litigation can easily reach the same
level as the PHC. Meanwhile, depending on the nature of the order being appealed,
the destination of an appeal from the multi-track of the IPEC is either the Court of
Appeal or the PHC/HC - final orders are appealed to the Court of Appeal whereas
interim orders are appealed to the PHC/HC (HMCTS, The Intellectual Property En-
terprise Court Guide, July 2016). IP case appeals from the IPEC to the Court of Appeal
are rare due to the cost involved (if parties have chosen the IPEC due to its limited
costs structure, they are rarely willing to spend hundreds of thousands of pounds ap-
pealing the initial ruling at the Court of Appeal). Moreover, appeals are much more
likely in complex cases i.e. cases suited to the PHC/HC, not the IPEC. Finally, the
destination of an appeal from a decision on the IPEC small claims track is to the IPEC
multi-track judge.
Remedies: All the remedies available in the PHC/HC are available in the IPEC multi-
track including preliminary and final injunctions, damages, accounts of profits, deliv-
ery up, disclosure, search and seizure and asset freezing. In other words, there are
no differences in the remedies each court can award (apart from the damages cap,
which restricts the level of damages available at the IPEC). However, the remedies
available in the IPEC small claims track are more limited - it has the power to order
final injunctions, and final damage awards, but it does not have the power to issue
preliminary injunctions, search and seizure orders or asset freezing orders.
Case transfers: With respect to the relationship between the IPEC and the PHC/HC,
the various jurisdictional changes in place at the IPEC between the period of our
study – 1 January 2007-31 December 2013 – are detailed below (and are further
outlined below in appendix B). A key aspect of this relationship relates to transfers:
the IPEC may transfer cases to the PHC/HC of its own accord (and the PHC/HC
i
may do likewise by transferring cases to the IPEC), in consideration of the size and
resources of the parties and the value and complexity of the claim(s) (Fox, 2014: 169-
172). Importantly, parties cannot contract out of the IPEC fee regime while staying
within the IPEC. In this regard, if a party wants to have unlimited costs/damages then
filing at the PHC is the only option. If a case is too complex for the IPEC, and thus
would not work within its strict cost/case management structures, it would typically
be transferred to the PHC in the above described manner.
Cost allocation: In England and Wales the substantive legal issues and the issues
of costs and damages are dealt with separately, and the losing party will typically
bear the brunt of the costs of the case on an issue-cost basis – the so-called ‘loser-
pays rule’ (McDonagh and Helmers, 2013a). This issue-based approach works such
that each party will have to pay the costs of the issues he/she lost at trail. For in-
stance, if a patent infringement trial concludes with a two-part ruling that (i) the
claimant’s patent was invalid and (ii) the defendant’s actvities would have infringed
the claimant’s patent if it had been valid, the claimant would have to pay the costs of
the part of the trial dedicated to the validity issue, and the defendant would have to
pay the costs of the part of the trial dedicated to the infringement issue.
Legal representation: At the IPEC and the PHC/HC litigants may be represented
before courts by appropriately qualified and certified barristers, solicitors, patent at-
torneys and trade mark attorneys.25 Legal representation is not required at the IPEC
small claims track level, though parties are free to obtain it if they wish.
B Appendix: Summary of legal changes
The following description shows the range of rights that could be litigated at the PCC prior
to September 2013 and at the IPEC post 1 October 2013. It is notable that prior to the recon-
stitution of the PCC as the IPEC in October 2013 the court’s ability to hear certain matters
was restricted in comparison with the list of matters that could be heard at the PHC/HC
during the same period. For example, its jurisdiction to hear patent matters (special) was
different in form than its power to hear copyright matters (ordinary). This distinction re-
stricted to some extent the types of remedies - such as asset freezing orders and orders
for search and seizure - that were available in different types of cases (it depended on the
type of jurisdiction the case fell into). One of the main reasons to highlight the information
below is to emphasize that the PCC was not merely ‘re-named’ as the IPEC – the court was
completely reconstituted in a manner that allows it to share jurisdiction with the PHC/HC
in virtually all IP matters, as shown below.
• 1 Jan 2007-30 September 2013 - PCC Jurisdiction (County Court with split jurisdic-
tion):
– Patents (special jurisdiction)
– Registered designs (U.K. and Community) (special jurisdiction)
25See Right to Conduct Litigation and Rights of Audience 2012.
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– Copyright (ordinary jurisdiction)
– Trademarks and Passing Off (U.K. and Community) (ordinary jurisdiction- though
with restrictions on invalidity actions with respect to CTMs)
– Unregistered designs (U.K. and Community) (ordinary jurisdiction)
– Databases (sui generis and Copyright)
– Ancilliary matters such as Breach of Confidence - only where linked to claim
within special or ordinary jurisdiction)
• 1 Oct 2013-31 December 2013 - IPEC Jurisdiction (Specialist Court within Chancery
Division)
– Patents
– Registered designs (U.K. and Community)
– Plant Variety rights and Semiconductor Topography rights
– Copyright
– Trade marks and Passing Off (U.K. and Community - though with restrictions on
invalidity actions with respect to CTMs)
– Unregistered designs (U.K. and Community)
– Databases (sui generis and Copyright)
– Breach of Confidence
– Ancillary matters (including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
malicious falsehood)
• 1 January 2007-31 December 2013 - HC Jurisdiction (Chancery Division)
– Copyright
– Trade marks and Passing Off (including Appeals from the Comptroller of Trade
Marks) (U.K. and Community - though restrictions on invalidity actions with
respect to CTMs
– Unregistered Designs (U.K. and Community)
– Databases (sui generis and Copyright)
– Breach of Confidence
– Ancillary matters (including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
malicious falsehood)
• 1 January 2007-31 December 2013 - PHC Jurisdiction (Specialist Court within Chancery
Division)
– Patents (including Appeals from the Comptroller of Patents)
– Registered Designs (U.K. and Community) (except for Appeals from the Comptroller
within jurisdiction of Registered Designs Appeal Tribunal)
– Plant Variety Rights and Semiconductor Topography rights
– Ancillary matters (including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
malicious falsehood)
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C Appendix: Model
Proof of Lemma 2
This result follows from the fact that the function D −→ Π∗(D,Rp,Rd) is continuous and
increasing. The continuity results from the differentiability of F(.) and f (.). The mono-
tonicity of the function is established below.
Assume that D and D′ are such that D < D < D′ < D¯ and let S′ be such that pˆ(D′,Rp,Rd ,S
′) =
p∗(D,Rp,Rd)(= pˆ(D,Rp,Rd ,S
∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

)). From the fact that pˆ is increasing in S and de-
creasing in D, and D < D′ it follows that S′ > S∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

. Thus, denoting
ρ∗ =
1
F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd))
∫ p∗(D,Rp ,Rd )
p
p f (p)dp
we have:
Πˆ(D′,Rp,Rd ,S
′) = (1− F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd)))S
′ + F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd))×
ρ∗
 
D′ − Cp + Rp

− (1−ρ∗)
 
Cp + Rd

− cp
> (1− F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd)S
∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

+ F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd))×
ρ∗
 
D− Cp + Rp

− (1−ρ∗)
 
Cp + Rd

− cp
= Π∗(D,Rp,Rd)
Since Π∗(D′,Rp,Rd) = max
S
Πˆ(D′,Rp,Rd ,S) then Π
∗(D′,Rp,Rd) ≥ Πˆ(D
′,Rp,Rd ,S
′) which,
combined with the inequality Πˆ(D′,Rp,Rd ,S
′)> Π∗(D,Rp,Rd) leads to
Π
∗(D′,Rp,Rd)> Π
∗(D,Rp,Rd).
This proves that Π∗(D,Rp,Rd) is increasing in D. Then, defining D
∗
 
Rp,Rd

as the unique
solution to Π∗(D,Rp,Rd) = 0 if Π
∗(D,Rp,Rd) < 0 and as D if Π
∗(D,Rp,Rd) ≥ 0, we get that
an IP holder od type D files a claim against the alleged infringer if and only:
D > D∗
 
Rp,Rd

.
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider Rp and R
′
p
such that Rp < R
′
p
. Let S′ be such that pˆ(D,R′
p
,Rd ,S
′) = p∗(D,Rp,Rd).
From the fact that pˆ is increasing in S and decreasing in Rp, and Rp < R
′
p
it follows that
S′ > S∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

. Thus, denoting
ρ∗ =
1
F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd))
∫ p∗(D,Rp ,Rd )
p
p f (p)dp
we have:
Πˆ(D,R′
p
,Rd ,S
′) = (1− F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd)))S
′ + F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd))×
ρ∗

D− Cp + R
′
p

− (1−ρ∗)
 
Cp + Rd

− cp
> (1− F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd)S
∗
 
D,Rp,Rd

+ F(p∗(D,Rp,Rd))×
ρ∗
 
D− Cp + Rp

− (1−ρ∗)
 
Cp + Rd

− cp
= Π∗(D,Rp,Rd)
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Since Π∗(D,R′
p
,Rd) =max
S
Πˆ(D,R′
p
,Rd ,S) then Π
∗(D,R′
p
,Rd)≥ Πˆ(D,R
′
p
,Rd ,S
′) which, com-
bined with the inequality Πˆ(D,R′
p
,Rd ,S
′)> Π∗(D,Rp,Rd), leads to
Π
∗(D,R′
p
,Rd)> Π
∗(D,Rp,Rd).
Therefore,
D∗

R′
p
,Rd

≤ D∗
 
Rp,Rd

Hence, ∂ D
∗
∂ Rp
≤ 0, which implies that
∂ (1− G
 
D∗
 
Rp,Rd

)
∂ Rp
≥ 0.
Consider now the effect of Rd on the number of filed claims. A similar reasoning shows that
the sign of ∂ D
∗
∂ Rd
is the opposite of the sign of ∂Π
∗
∂ Rd
. However, the sign of the latter is generally
ambiguous, which leads to the second part of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 3
From expression (2) and the assumption that the hazard rate
f
1−F
is increasing it follows
that p∗(D,Rp,Rd) increases in Rp and Rd . Therefore, 1− F(p
∗(D,Rp,Rd)) decreases with Rp
and Rd .
D Appendix: Data
D.1 IPEC 2007-2013
We collected information on all IP cases filed at the IPEC for the entire period 2007-13.
In order to do this, we first compiled the physical IPEC court records/files and associated
information for all cases filed 2007-13; secondly, we used a set of specially devised IP right-
specific spreadsheets to extract and organize the relevant information gathered from these
often extremely detailed and complex records; thirdly, we compiled the different files into
a single database. Nonetheless, because the record keeping at the IPEC is largely paper-
based, it is not uncommon for case files to be misfiled, or to go missing altogether. For
this reason there are a very small number of cases for which we were unable to obtain
any information except for the case number. Nonetheless, we are confident that we have
examined every possible physical IPEC case file for 2007-13. To double check, in September
2014 we examined the available IPEC judgments for 2007-13 online (via BAILII); we did
not find any cases that we did not already have a record of from our search of the physical
files.
For IPEC cases, the information that we collected on IP cases filed 2007-13 contains de-
tailed information on the start date of the case, the initial and counter claims (infringement,
revocation etc.), the names of the litigating parties, information on the relevant IP right (in-
cluding patent numbers, trademark numbers etc.), and the outcomes of the cases. We also
gathered information on whether cases were transferred from the IPEC to the PHC/HC or
vice versa. These data were collected during the period September 2013-July 2014 and
these spreadsheets are up to date in terms of outcomes (decided cases, settlements etc.) up
to July 2014.
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D.2 PHC/HC
We collected the same set of information on patent cases at the PHC as for the IPEC for the
entire 2007-2013 period. For all other IP rights (trademark, design, copyright, and database
related disputes), we collected only the following streamlined data for all PHC/HC cases
filed 2009-2013:
• Case numbers;
• Parties to the claim;
• Initial claim(s);
• Type of IP right(s) litigated – noting differences within IP rights where relevant –
for instance, whether the right was a Community TM, or a U.K. TM (registered or
unregistered), or a U.K. or Community unregistered/registered design right.
Similar to the IPEC data collection, we undertook a number of checks to ensure the
completeness of the patent data:
• For the years 2011 and 2012, we were able to cross-reference patent cases via a list
that the law firm Powell-Gilbert had provided us of case file numbers drawn from a
physical search of files they had undertaken during early 2013.
• We used the Patents Court Diary in order to cross-reference the listed cases with what
we found in the physical records to ensure no cases were missed.
• We liaised with HMCTS regarding their published records for the amount of PHC
cases filed per year. However, on completion of the search what we found was that
the published HMCTS statistics are not an accurate reflection of the amount of cases
actually filed per year.
• As with the IPEC, from September-October 2014 we examined the available PHC
patent judgments for 2007-13 online (via BAILII). Thus, as with the IPEC, while there
are a very small number of patent PHC cases for which we are missing data, we are
confident that our PHC dataset comprehensively includes all available physical and
online records.
E Appendix: Variable Description
This appendix describes the construction of the variables used in our analysis.
• Dependent variables
– Settlement: the outcome of a case is coded as settlement if the court does not
hand down a decision. Settlements include court settlements as well as out-of-
court settlements.
• Case characteristics
vi
– Case transferred: the variable is equal to one if a case was transferred to the
PCC/IPEC from another court or cases were transferred between the PCC/IPEC
and the PHC.
– Case value: the litigating parties specify the value of the case on the claim form.
– Infringement claim: the variable is equal to one if the plaintiff alleges infringe-
ment of the IP right.
– Invalidity claim: the variable is equal to one if the plaintiff alleges that the IP
right is invalid.
• Litigant characteristics
– Size: we categorized companies according to the EU definition into four size
categories using a combination of the number of employees, turnover, and to-
tal assets. If several companies from the same business group appeared as co-
plaintiffs or co-defendants, we allocated the entire business group into the size
category of its largest member.
– Residence: we identified a company’s origin using information available in the
court records, Bureau van Dijk’s FAME and Amadeus databases, as well as web
searchers. We then allocated companies into three categories: domestic (U.K.),
Europe, and rest of the world.
– Non-practicing entity (NPE): we identified NPEs by identifying the patent holder
in each case and we then determined manually, using web searches, news re-
ports, court filings, and the existing academic literature onNPEs and PAEswhether
a patent holder was an NPE at the time of the court case. For more details see
Love et al. (2016).
• IP characteristics
– Forward citations (in first 3 years): we counted the number of patents citing the
focal patent within the first three years after the earliest publication.
– Backward citations (patents): we counted a patent’s number of citations to other
patents.
– Backward citations (non-patent): we counted a patent’s number of citations to
non-patent literature.
– IPC subclasses count: we counted the number of unique IPC subclasses of the
patent.
– Family size (DOCDB):we counted the number of patents that belong to the same
family (according to the DOCDB definition) of the patent.
– EP patent: we created a binary variable that indicates whether a patent is a
European patent (EP).
– Registered Community Design: we created a binary variable that indicates whether
a registered design right is a community design registered with the EU IPO.
– Registered U.K. Design: we created a binary variable that indicates whether a
registered design right is a U.K. design registered with the U.K. IPO.
vii
– Registered Community Trademark: we created a binary variable that indicates
whether a registered trademark right is a community trademark registered with
the EU IPO.
– Registered UK Trademark: we created a binary variable that indicates whether a
registered trademark right is a U.K. trademark registered with the U.K. IPO.
– Madrid Trademark: we created a binary variable that indicates whether a regis-
tered trademark right was filed via WIPO (the Madrid system).
viii
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Figure A-3: Comparison IPEC/PHC: patent cases
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G Appendix: Tables
Table A-1: IPEC an PHC/HC case counts excluding dropped cases, 2007-2013
Year Patent Trade mark Design Copyright Database Total
IPEC PHC IPEC HC IPEC HC IPEC HC IPEC HC IPEC HC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2007 3 26 1 2 6 0 12 30
2008 2 57 13 3 20 0 38 64
2009 6 32 22 63 11 14 15 54 2 4 56 178
2010 6 37 28 105 16 41 28 68 2 16 80 274
2011 23 75 43 101 21 21 35 74 3 21 125 304
2012 19 79 60 94 31 13 33 50 1 7 144 248
2013 12 50 64 58 36 19 46 69 2 6 160 208
Total 71 356 231 421 120 108 183 315 10 54 615 1,254
Notes: Note: For PHC/HC no data available for trade marks, design, copyright and database rights prior to 2009; trade mark case
count includes passing-off claims; design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Copyright case counts exclude cases
brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). Cases at the IPEC and PHC (patents) excluded if
the plaintiff dropped the case unilaterally (no settlement) or only a claim form was filed and there is no response by the defendant or
other actions by the plaintiff.
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Table A-2: IPEC and PHC differences in means, 2007-2013
Year Mean Diff. # Obs.
PHC IPEC PHC IPEC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All IP cases
Settled 0.694 0.692 -0.001 321 563
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.003 0.222 0.218*** 321 563
ln case value 10.975 10.491 -0.484** 37 295
Infringement claim 0.492 0.943 0.450*** 321 563
Invalidity claim 0.429 0.046 0.383*** 321 563
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME 0.146 0.536 0.389*** 321 563
Defendant SME 0.233 0.596 0.363*** 321 563
Plaintiff Europe 0.311 0.060 -0.251*** 321 563
Plaintiff World 0.345 0.119 -0.226*** 321 563
Defendant Europe 0.336 0.026 -0.309*** 321 563
Defendant World 0.302 0.024 -0.277*** 321 563
Patents
Settled 0.694 0.676 -0.017 321 65
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.003 0.153 0.150*** 321 65
ln case value 10.975 11.531 0.555 37 23
Infringement claim 0.492 0.753 -0.261*** 321 65
Invalidity claim 0.429 0.153 -0.276*** 321 65
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME 0.146 0.630 0.484*** 321 65
Defendant SME 0.233 0.661 0.427*** 321 65
Plaintiff Europe 0.311 0.138 -0.173*** 321 65
Plaintiff World 0.345 0.076 -0.268*** 321 65
Defendant Europe 0.336 0.076 -0.259*** 321 65
Defendant World 0.302 0.138 -0.163*** 321 65
Notes: Note: For PHC no data available for trade marks, design, copyright and database rights prior to 2009; trade mark case count
includes passing-off claims; design cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Copyright case counts exclude cases brought
by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). Cases at the IPEC and PHC (patents) excluded if the
plaintiff dropped the case unilaterally (no settlement) or only a claim form was filed and there is no response by the defendant or other
actions by the plaintiff.
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Table A-3: IPEC and PHC: Descriptive statistics, 2007-2013
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
All IP cases
Settled 0.693 0.461 0 1 884
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.142 0.349 0 1 884
ln case value 3.960 5.175 0 14.508 884
Infringement claim 0.779 0.414 0 1 884
Invalidity claim 0.185 0.388 0 1 884
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME 0.394 0.489 0 1 884
Defendant SME 0.464 0.499 0 1 884
Plaintiff Europe 0.151 0.358 0 1 884
Plaintiff World 0.201 0.401 0 1 884
Defendant Europe 0.139 0.346 0 1 884
Defendant World 0.125 0.331 0 1 884
NPE 0.050 0.219 0 1 884
IP characteristics
Patent family 9.574 17.523 0 136 884
Forward citation count (3 years) 1.722 5.681 0 65 884
Backward citation count 1.929 4.612 0 87 884
Non-patent backward citation count 1.203 6.858 0 132 884
IPC subclass count 1.538 2.950 0 36 884
EP patent 0.361 0.480 0 1 884
Registered Community Design 0.037 0.189 0 1 884
Registered U.K. Design 0.022 0.148 0 1 884
Registered Community Trademark 0.085 0.280 0 1 884
Registered U.K. Trademark 0.159 0.366 0 1 884
Madrid Trademark 0.006 0.082 0 1 884
Patents
Settled 0.691 0.462 0 1 386
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.028 0.166 0 1 386
ln case value 1.739 4.102 0 13.815 386
Infringement claim 0.536 0.499 0 1 386
Invalidity claim 0.383 0.486 0 1 386
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME 0.227 0.420 0 1 386
Defendant SME 0.305 0.461 0 1 386
Plaintiff Europe 0.282 0.450 0 1 386
Plaintiff World 0.300 0.459 0 1 386
Defendant Europe 0.292 0.455 0 1 386
Defendant World 0.274 0.446 0 1 386
NPE 0.116 0.321 0 1 386
Patent characteristics
Patent family 21.777 20.925 0 136 386
Forward citation count (3 years) 3.943 8.077 0 65 386
Backward citation count 4.308 6.166 0 87 386
Non-patent backward citation count 2.738 10.181 0 132 386
IPC subclass count 3.502 3.615 0 36 386
EP patent 0.816 0.387 0 1 386
xii
Table A-4: IPEC and PHC: Descriptive statistics – only cases involving SMEs, 2007-2013
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
All IP cases
Settled 0.701 0.458 0 1 552
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.190 0.392 0 1 552
ln case value 4.940 5.341 0 14.508 552
Infringement claim 0.920 0.271 0 1 552
Invalidity claim 0.045 0.208 0 1 552
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME 0.632 0.482 0 1 552
Defendant SME 0.744 0.436 0 1 552
Plaintiff Europe 0.086 0.282 0 1 552
Plaintiff World 0.108 0.311 0 1 552
Defendant Europe 0.038 0.191 0 1 552
Defendant World 0.038 0.191 0 1 552
NPE 0.012 0.111 0 1 552
IP characteristics
Patent family 4.485 12.557 0 136 552
Forward citation count (3 years) 0.713 3.055 0 37 552
Backward citation count 1.188 2.815 0 17 552
Non-patent backward citation count 0.318 1.783 0 25 552
IPC subclass count 0.706 1.978 0 20 552
EP patent 0.181 0.385 0 1 552
Registered Community Design 0.043 0.204 0 1 552
Registered U.K. Design 0.034 0.182 0 1 552
Registered Community Trademark 0.103 0.304 0 1 552
Registered U.K. Trademark 0.211 0.409 0 1 552
Madrid Trademark 0.005 0.073 0 1 552
Patents
Settled 0.723 0.449 0 1 123
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.081 0.274 0 1 123
ln case value 3.149 5.169 0 13.815 123
Infringement claim 0.772 0.421 0 1 123
Invalidity claim 0.105 0.308 0 1 123
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME 0.593 0.493 0 1 123
Defendant SME 0.788 0.409 0 1 123
Plaintiff Europe 0.195 0.397 0 1 123
Plaintiff World 0.170 0.377 0 1 123
Defendant Europe 0.113 0.318 0 1 123
Defendant World 0.130 0.337 0 1 123
NPE 0.040 0.198 0 1 123
Patent characteristics
Patent family 16.097 19.035 0 136 123
Forward citation count (3 years) 3.048 5.889 0 37 123
Backward citation count 4.227 4.201 0 17 123
Non-patent backward citation count 1.308 3.592 0 25 123
IPC subclass count 2.560 3.097 0 20 123
EP patent 0.642 0.481 0 1 123
xiii
Table A-5: IPEC and PHC: settlement decision by quarter, 2007-2012
All IP Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Costs cap
IPEC -0.058 -0.102 -0.198** -0.058 -0.060 -0.095
(0.086) (0.087) (0.090) (0.168) (0.165) (0.158)
Postreform 0.160 0.387* 0.369* 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.996***
(0.224) (0.206) (0.202) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
IPEC×Postreform -0.075 -0.070 -0.083 -0.241 -0.261 -0.342*
(0.082) (0.081) (0.085) (0.193) (0.189) (0.181)
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.078 0.084 0.069 0.076 0.080 0.084
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.140) (0.136) (0.132)
ln case value 0.022 0.021 0.016 0.012 0.023 0.047
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Infringement claim -0.085 -0.033 -0.101 0.038
(0.075) (0.082) (0.110) (0.126)
Invalidity claim -0.175** -0.110 -0.190 -0.058
(0.089) (0.090) (0.118) (0.126)
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME -0.113*** -0.124*** -0.159*** 0.106 0.109 0.037
(0.042) (0.047) (0.050) (0.069) (0.075) (0.085)
Defendant SME 0.144*** 0.104** 0.096** 0.099 0.014 -0.030
(0.039) (0.043) (0.044) (0.059) (0.076) (0.081)
Plaintiff Europe 0.020 0.030 0.103 0.068
(0.057) (0.057) (0.065) (0.067)
Plaintiff World 0.033 0.010 0.066 0.0002
(0.051) (0.054) (0.065) (0.069)
Defendant Europe -0.117 -0.120* 0.151* -0.175**
(0.075) (0.075) (0.083) (0.083)
Defendant World -0.098 -0.109 -0.079 -0.111
(0.073) (0.077) (0.078) (0.080)
NPE 0.028 -0.137 0.045 -0.150
(0.077) (0.097) (0.083) (0.107)
IP characteristics NO NO YES NO NO YES
Technology FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
IP type FE YES YES YES NA NA NA
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.095 0.152 0.118 0.146 0.236
Number obs. 731 731 731 352 352 352
Notes: Probit regression. Marginal effects reported. Dependant variable equal to one if case settled. All regressions include a con-
stant. Time period is 2007-2013; PHC/HC data contain only patent cases; trademark case count includes passing-off claims; design
cases includes registered and unregistered design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL
(Phonographic Performance Limited). IP type FE: dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered
design, database). IP characteristics not reported include: patents – patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in
first 3 years), number of International Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, and a dummy variable equal to one
if EP patent; trademarks – dummy variables equal to one if registered community, U.K., or Madrid (WIPO) trademark filing litigated,
omitted category is unregistered trademark/passing off; design rights – dummy variables equal to one if registered community or U.K.
design right litigated, omitted category is unregistered design. Regressions include a dummy variable equal to one if the case value is
missing and a dummy variable equal to one if no patent information is available for a patent case. Technology effects for patent cases
include indicators for each main technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical engineering, other). Robust
standard errors clustered at the case-level. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.xiv
Table A-6: IPEC and PHC: settlement decision by quarter – only cases involving SMEs,
2007-2012
All IP Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Costs cap
IPEC -0.061 -0.035 -0.048 -0.007 0.072 0.096
(0.100) (0.107) (0.111) (0.153) (0.135) (0.071)
Postreform -0.850*** -0.930*** -0.841*** -0.040 0.578* 0.214
(0.083) (0.043) (0.135) (0.252) (0.266) (0.301)
IPEC×Postreform -0.198 -0.291** -0.497*** -0.548** -0.735*** -0.989***
(0.131) (0.132) (0.138) (0.218) (0.179) (0.021)
Case characteristics
Case transferred 0.045 0.054 0.053 0.083 0.119 0.054
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.129) (0.109) (0.038)
ln case value 0.019 0.026 0.017 0.140** 0.166** 0.070**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.065) (0.062) (0.041)
Infringement claim -0.115 -0.064 0.065
(0.088) (0.100) (0.137)
Invalidity claim 0.001 0.057 -0.026
(0.124) (0.120) (0.123)
Litigant characteristics
Plaintiff SME -0.126** -0.127** -0.146** 0.068 0.111 0.243**
(0.052) (0.056) (0.057) (0.114) (0.125) (0.124)
Defendant SME 0.125** 0.126** 0.123* 0.001 0.012 0.127
(0.063) (0.066) (0.066) (0.113) (0.146) (0.129)
Plaintiff Europe -0.092 -0.205* 0.087 -0.138
(0.106) (0.127) (0.105) (0.158)
Plaintiff World 0.126 0.125 0.180 0.091*
(0.069) (0.074) (0.080) (0.038)
Defendant Europe -0.244* -0.204 -0.205 -0.102
(0.154) (0.172) (0.163) (0.139)
Defendant World 0.072 0.121 -0.132 0.077*
(0.114) (0.099) (0.091) (0.032)
NPE -0.077 -0.219 -0.279 -0.806***
(0.181) (0.265) (0.238) (0.211)
IP characteristics NO NO YES NO NO YES
Technology FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
IP type FE YES YES YES NA NA NA
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.131 0.186 0.158 0.223 0.395
Number obs. 455 455 455 119 119 119
Notes: Probit regression. Marginal effects reported. Dependant variable equal to one if case settled. All regressions include a constant.
Time period is 2007-2013; sample contains only cases involving at least one SME as either plaintiff or defendant or both; PHC/HC
data contain only patent cases; trademark case count includes passing-off claims; design cases includes registered and unregistered
design rights. Case counts exclude cases brought by performance rights organisation PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited). IP
type FE: dummy variable for each type of IP right (patent, trademark, copyright, registered design, database). IP characteristics not
reported include: patents – patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in first 3 years), number of International Patent
Classification (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, and a dummy variable equal to one if EP patent; trademarks – dummy variables equal
to one if registered community, U.K., or Madrid (WIPO) trademark filing litigated, omitted category is unregistered trademark/passing
off; design rights – dummy variables equal to one if registered community or U.K. design right litigated, omitted category is unregistered
design. Regressions include a dummy variable equal to one if the case value is missing and a dummy variable equal to one if no patent
information is available for a patent case. Technology effects for patent cases include indicators for each main technology area (electrical
engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical engineering, other). Robust standard errors clustered at the case-level. * significant at
10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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